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Abstract As part of an ongoing research effort on separation assurance and functional allocation in NextGen, a control-
ler-in-the-loop study with ground-based automation was conducted at NASA Ames’ Airspace Operations Laboratory in Au-
gust 2012 to investigate the potential impact of introducing self-separating aircraft in progressively advanced NextGen time-
frames. From this larger study, the current exploratory analysis of controller-automation interaction styles focuses on the last 
and most far-term time frame. Measurements were recorded that firstly verified the continued operational validity of this it-
eration of the ground-based functional allocation automation concept in forecast traffic densities up to 2x that of current day 
high altitude en-route sectors. Additionally, with greater levels of fully automated conflict detection and resolution as well 
as the introduction of intervention functionality, objective and subjective analyses showed a range of passive to active con-
troller-automation interaction styles between the participants. Not only did the controllers work with the automation to meet 
their safety and capacity goals in the simulated future NextGen timeframe, they did so in different ways and with different 
attitudes of trust/use of the automation. Taken as a whole, the results showed that the prototyped controller-automation func-
tional allocation framework was very flexible and successful overall.     
Keywords controller-in-the-loop, AOL, NASA, NextGen, automation, separation assurance, functional allocation 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In the present day high altitude en-route environment of 
the United States National Airspace System, aircraft sepa-
ration assurance is achieved by a highly labor intensive 
process of dutiful air traffic controllers on the ground. 
Monitoring the progress of aircraft across their display, the 
controllers scan their sector by watching each and every 
aircraft in order to identify potential separation risks and to 
mentally calculate conflict avoidance possibilities. From 
the time any aircraft checks in with one controller until it 
is handed off to the next, all clearances are devised men-
tally, manually, and individually by the controller and is-
sued verbally over a radio frequency. With great scrutiny, 
attention, and positive personal control over each of the 
aircraft in their sector, en-route controllers have main-
tained a commendable safety record and contribute greatly 
to the overall US air traffic control system being the safest 
in the world [1]. 
Current forecasts by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) show continued growth in demand, in particu-
lar for the en-route centers, due to a faster growing com-
mercial sector. The number of commercial aircraft is 
projected to grow from 2011 to 2032 at an average growth 
rate of about 1.5 percent or 127 aircraft annually. Similarly 
up to 2032, commercial IFR aircraft handled at FAA en-
route centers has been projected to increase 2.4 percent 
annually [2]. These forecasts pose a problem for en-route 
controllers because they exceed monitor alert parameters 
(MAP) values which have been defined to limit the num-
ber of aircraft permitted in a sector as a safeguard prior to 
which performance is expected to decline. Natural cogni-
tive processing limits of air traffic controllers have been 
accepted as potential bottlenecks against rising air traffic 
demand on account of the number of planes any person 
could reasonably be expected to track. Complementary to 
the FAA forecasts, the US Congress established the Joint 
Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to develop the 
Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) 
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which among its many visions, explicitly aims to over-
come the capacity limits imposed by individually attended 
aircraft separation procedures of today and requires a re-
structuring of the roles of humans and automation and how 
they perform their respective functions to synergize human 
and automation performance [3].  
To meet the forecast demand increase, separation man-
agement components of en-route NextGen environments 
are envisioned to rely on automation to augment human 
performance beyond today’s limits by offloading workload 
from the human controllers onto automated functions for 
the majority of routine operations. Use of automated con-
flict detection and resolution decision aides that are seam-
lessly integrated within ground automation systems is 
planned to allow separation management tasks to move 
away from fixed human-based standards while always 
maintaining an unambiguous delegation of responsibility. 
Automation is anticipated to support a migration from tac-
tical to strategic decision making as well as perform many 
routine tasks. With layers of protection that allow for 
graceful degradation of situations, automation reliance is 
planned to be coupled with modes that do not require full 
reliance on humans as backup. Building from today’s cur-
rent roles, the corresponding NextGen roles for air traffic 
controllers that stand to benefit from use of automation in-
clude: identifying complex future conflicts, management 
of individual aircraft trajectories, and detecting and resolv-
ing conflicts via automation while eliminating residual 
conflicts [3]. Use of data communications that are inte-
grated with ground automation is envisioned to reduce the 
number of voice communications and controller workload, 
and hence increase the controller’s efficiency and ability to 
manage more traffic [4]. While providing tactical and stra-
tegic separation management, en-route trajectory based 
operations (TBO) automation is planned to provide the 
ability to request modifications of trajectories and support 
trajectory negotiation. [5]. 
However, relying on automation to fully or partially re-
place a function previously carried out by a human opera-
tor means that automation need not be all or none, but can 
vary across a continuum of levels, from the lowest level of 
fully manual performance to the highest level of full au-
tomation. Furthermore, the specific function with its vari-
ant level of manual/automatic control, itself can range 
along a variety of human information processing sub-tasks 
or stages [6]. As a simple example, the function of detect-
ing a conflict could be fully automatic, fully manual, or 
somewhere in between and this could exist along with dif-
ferent levels of automation for the subsequent separate 
function of conflict resolution, which could itself be fully 
automatic, fully manual, or somewhere in between. It has 
been shown that the flexibility of an automation system 
contributes to its use case as task load and complexity in-
crease [7].  
In addition to being flexible and multi-layered, other 
beneficial design factors can encourage effective trust and 
use within human-automation systems. Recent research 
suggests that humans respond socially to technology and 
reactions to computers can be similar to reactions to hu-
man collaborators [8]. In commonly observed effective 
human teamwork and collaboration, both parties walk a 
line to balance what they perceive the other is capable of 
while they, themselves, exhibit evidence of their own reli-
ability in handling certain tasks. In general, someone’s ca-
pability with simpler tasks is commonly held to reflect 
their capability with more complex tasks. Research on sys-
tem credibility established within the context of simple de-
cision tasks has been conducted and has shown that opera-
tors who experience an automated system’s failures in 
easy tasks are less likely to comply with the automation’s 
recommendations during a more difficult task [9]. Rather 
than taken on immediate face value, automation is scruti-
nized for its credibility through operator experiences with 
that automation, i.e. trust is learned. Considering that en-
tire schools of cognitive theory have posited active partici-
pation as preferable over passive reception or observation, 
at least some sense of control is assumed to be of crucial 
importance for an operator to work with and appropriately 
trust automation.  Automation surprises occur when tech-
nology autonomously performs tasks that cause a system 
to behave in a manner that the operator had not anticipated 
and it has been assumed that such a decrease in situation 
awareness arises from a non-satisfaction of a self-agency 
mechanism [10]. In other words, allowing the operator 
some form of control over the automation is expected to 
enhance the human-automation work dynamic.  
 
2. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
 
2.1 Ground-Based Automated Separation As-
surance 
Informed from the guidelines of the JPDO and human-
automation functional allocation literature referenced 
above, our NextGen prototype instantiation of a ground-
based automated separation assurance concept is next 
briefly described in this section. More detailed accounts of 
the precise characteristics and evolution of the concept can 
be found in the prior separation assurance (SA) research 
conducted at NASA Ames [11-18]. Additionally, comple-
mentary and collaborative airborne-based separation as-
surance concepts are detailed in research conducted at and 
with NASA Langley [19-20]. 
Ground-based automated separation assurance involves 
automation components that monitor and/or manage nom-
inal TBO equipped aircraft, while the controller handles 
off-nominal operations, provides additional services, and 
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makes decisions when human involvement is needed. The 
primary difference from today’s system is automated con-
flict detection and automated conflict resolution via data 
link. Controller involvement in routine conflicts is only 
required when an automatic trajectory change would ex-
ceed defined thresholds.   
2.1.1 Enabling Environment 
Each aircraft was assumed to be equipped with inte-
grated data communications capabilities for route modifi-
cations, frequency changes, cruise altitude changes, and 
climb, cruise and descent speed modifications as well as 
high accuracy surveillance data provided via Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B). Automated 
trajectory-based conflict resolutions were generated for 
conflicts with more than three minutes to initial loss of 
separation (LOS). For those with less time before LOS, a 
separate automated tactical conflict avoidance function 
(TSAFE) could generate a resolution and send heading 
changes to the aircraft directly.     
2.1.2 Roles and Responsibilities 
The automation detected conflicts, computed resolu-
tions and/or alerted controllers. It nominally functioned by 
automatically sending instructions to aircraft via data link 
unless they exceeded a priori defined thresholds. The au-
tomation also augmented controller awareness and provid-
ed conflict status and probing tools. Primarily, the control-
ler managed the automation, handled off-nominal 
situations and made decisions on situations when present-
ed.  
2.1.3 Air Traffic Controller Workstation 
Figure 1 depicts the air traffic controller workstation 
prototype designed for the above distribution of roles and 
responsibilities. Aircraft that were managed by the auto-
mation and within the controller’s sector are displayed in a 
brighter gray than low-lighted exterior aircraft. Additional 
information in data tags and colors were used to draw the 
controller’s attention to a specific problem. The display 
was designed for general situation awareness and man-
agement by exception. The following figures present more 
detailed depictions of the various aspects of the interface 
controller’s used to interact with the automation tools. 
 
Figure 1. Controller display with conflict list, an active conflict de-
ferred by the automation to the controller (yellow), and a provisional res-
olution trajectory that currently conflicts with a third aircraft (cyan). 
 
Nominally aircraft data tags were collapsed and ap-
peared only as a chevron target with an altitude tag be-
cause routine aircraft operations such as frequency chang-
es, hand-offs, climbs and descents, etc. were conducted 
automatically without controller involvement (Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 2. Collapsed aircraft data tags as chevrons with altitude tags. 
Expanded data tags were used only in conjunction with 
situations requiring human attention. Figure 3 provides ar-
tificially arranged and ordered examples of what these 
looked like: A) highlighted when manually expanded by 
the controller, B) a “long-term” seven mins to LOS con-
flict number in gray C) a “medium-term” five mins to LOS 
conflict number in yellow, D) a “short term” three mins to 
LOS with target symbol, data tag, and conflict number in 
red, E) an auto-generated short term conflict resolution 
advisory in red, F) a conflict deferred by the automation to 
the controller in yellow, G) a conflict that the automation 
is still “thinking” about, and H) an aircraft placed in an au-
to-uplink inhibited status by a controller.  
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Figure 3. Expanded data tag examples.  
Data tags contained items (Fig. 4) that controllers could 
left/right click on to initiate different trial plans/auto-
resolution requests. For example, left clicking on the arrow 
opened a lateral trial plan; right clicking on the time to 
LOS requested an auto-resolution from the automation 
along the lateral dimension; right clicking on the altitude 
requested an auto-resolution along the vertical dimension. 
Also, controllers could click on the diamond to access a 
data communications menu.   
 
Figure 4. Clickable data tag items. 
Figure 5 depicts the conflict detection alert and automa-
tion status table. Each row represented a conflict and pro-
vided the callsigns of the involved aircraft, their datalink 
eligibility and their vertical status (climbing, descending, 
or level). The count down time to initial LOS was dis-
played in minutes, the predicted horizontal separation in 
nautical miles, and the predicted vertical separation in 
hundreds of feet. Last in the row, a dynamically color-
coded box was used to indicate the current action-state of 
the automation in regard to that specific conflict.   
2.1.4 Current Additions for Present Analysis  
In line with the separation management standards and 
visions of the JPDO, the broader human factors research in 
human-automation functional allocation and trust intro-
duced above, as well as participant comments from prior 
SA research, new adjustments and additions were made in 
the current study’s human-automation interaction envi-
ronment. Criteria thresholds for when the automation acted 
independently of the controller were changed and new in-
tervention functionalities were introduced. 
The thresholds were changed to provide a wider range 
of instances where the automation could uplink resolutions 
directly to aircraft without controller involvement (i.e. 
full-auto resolutions) while simultaneously increasing the 
amount of time available for a controller to observe or act 
prior to those uplinks by the automation. Specifically, full-
auto resolution limits were increased to impositions on air-
craft of up to 90 seconds or more of delay, 60 or more de-
grees of heading change, 2,200 or more feet of altitude 
change, and/or 200 or more knots of speed change. Within 
these limits, the automation was permitted to directly issue 
an uplink resolution without involving the controller. Ad-
ditionally, these criteria-bounded full-auto resolutions 
could only take place on conflicts that had no more than 
eight minutes until LOS while the conflicts themselves 
could be displayed as early as ten minutes until LOS. Fur-
thermore, auto-generated TSAFE resolution advisories for 
short-term conflicts were eligible for direct uplink without 
controller involvement within two minutes to LOS. Sug-
gested resolutions could be displayed as early as three 
minutes to LOS.  
Based on prior feedback regarding the desire to main-
tain a certain level of control over the automation, new in-
tervention functionalities were introduced that provided 
Figure 5. Conflict detection alert and automation status table. 
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the controllers with an ability to inhibit/allow the automat-
ic uplink aspect of the automation. At any point, a control-
ler could input an “NU” (i.e., no uplinks) command and 
select one or more aircraft to put into a status where the 
automation was prohibited from uplinking conflict resolu-
tions to the aircraft without their involvement. This status 
persisted for the aircraft until the same controller entered 
an “AU” (i.e., allow uplinks) command or the aircraft was 
handed off to the next controller.  
 
2.2 Problem Statement of Current Analysis 
The full-auto criteria adjustments described above 
combine to provide more opportunities for controllers to 
observe the automation successfully accomplish its work 
in handling simpler or “easy” conflicts. This complement-
ed its already apparent proficiency with the routine hand-
off and frequency changes. These opportunities are ex-
pected to support and engender actions from the control-
lers consistent with a perspective of reliability or trust in 
the automation. Such positive experience is assumedly es-
sential as a precursor to effective interactions with the au-
tomation in more complex or critical situations. Further-
more, the addition of intervention functionality is expected 
to foster a sense of engagement, participation and control 
that should facilitate the controllers’ confidence with and 
effective use of the automation.  
First, verification that the prototyped human-
automation functional allocation operational concept of 
this iteration of SA research continues to support the con-
trollers in the NextGen envisioned environment by main-
taining the FAA’s safe separation standards and forecast 
levels of increased traffic densities is of principal interest 
to the current analysis. Next, the present analysis aims to 
provide a characterization of the transitioning separation 
assurance responsibilities between the controllers and the 
automation to explore the different interaction styles of 
controller trust and use of the automation, and lend insight 
towards possible factors that contribute to those shifting 
human-automation interaction styles. 
 
3. METHOD 
 
3.1 Apparatus 
The entire operational environment was simulated us-
ing the Multi Aircraft Control System (MACS) software 
package [21] developed and maintained by the Airspace 
Operations Laboratory (AOL) software team. MACS is a 
java based scalable platform used for the prototyping of air 
traffic management displays and concepts that range from 
the current day and up through exploratory far term time 
frames. For each sector presently analyzed a radar control-
ler (R-side) workstation consisted of a standard desktop 
PC with 75cm Barco monitor and Display System Re-
placement (DSR) keyboard and trackball as input devices. 
These workstations were also equipped with tablet PCs 
that were used for voice communications similar to the 
presently fielded Voice Communications System (VCS). 
Seven pseudopilot stations with standard desktop PC set-
ups were used for the management of flights within the 
simulation. 
3.2 Design 
The present analysis focuses on the last six runs of a 
larger human-in-the-loop SA study aimed to investigate 
the potential impact of introducing self-separating aircraft 
in progressively futuristic NextGen time-frames. The full 
study simulated four different time-frame environments 
and the last block of six runs were dedicated to represent-
ing the environment furthest into the future and with the 
most advanced human-automation operational paradigm. 
This portion of the study consisted of two days: one full 
day of training with a morning classroom briefing on the 
new environment assumptions and automation capabilities, 
hands-on learning activities, two training runs and discus-
sion sessions followed by a second day of six different 40-
minute data collection runs. 
Traffic scenarios were developed to present each con-
troller participant with a varying range of aircraft densities 
for their sector over the course of a run to represent an ap-
proximate FAA NextGen forecast level of approximately 
twice that of current day levels (approx. 13 – 17 aircraft in 
a sector at any given point) resulting in peak instantaneous 
traffic counts of well over 30 aircraft in a sector. Scripted 
conflicts between aircraft trajectories were included in the 
density mix in addition to those that would naturally occur 
on account of the increased traffic levels.         
3.3 Airspace 
The airspace simulated five high altitude sectors from 
Cleveland Center (ZOB) in the central region of the Unit-
ed States: ZOB 26, ZOB 38, ZOB 79, ZOB 49 and ZOB 
59. The floor of each sector was set at flight level (FL) 330 
with confederate controllers handling the traffic outside of 
the five test sectors as well as the aircraft below. As seen 
in Fig. 6, each sector has unique geographic boundaries 
and different characteristics of aircraft density, traffic 
flows and complexity. Arrivals and departures from local 
area airports (e.g., Toronto-YYZ) contributed to these in-
dividual sector differences.   
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Figure 6. Simulated airspace. 
3.4 Participants 
The participants consisted of seven current FAA front 
line managers, each from different enroute centers and 
current on radar rating and certification. Of these, five 
served as radar (R-side) controllers and two served as area 
supervisors that had five different recently retired confed-
erate controllers available for on-call data (D-side) control 
positions to support the R-sides. In addition to the D-sides, 
two other recently retired controllers served as confederate 
“Ghost” positions that managed the air traffic outside of 
the test area. Additional confederates included seven gen-
eral aviation and student pilots that acted as pseudopilots 
and were assigned to each of the test sectors and surround-
ing areas.     
3.5 Procedure 
During the runs, the tasks of the control team were dif-
ferent in many respects from what they are today. As this 
was a functional allocation study of ground-based auto-
mated separation assurance, the main departures were 
along such lines: the automation was responsible for 
handoffs, transfers of communication, conflict detection, 
and conflict resolutions within defined parameters; the 
controllers were responsible for monitoring the automa-
tion’s performance, handling conflict situations deferred 
by the automation, and exercising control of the automa-
tion to ensure an efficient and effective flow of traffic 
through the sector. Additional irregular events of varying 
situational awareness demand and potential consequence 
to automation acceptance, e.g. descent/climb requests from 
pilots due to turbulence however were not yet explicitly 
controlled for investigation within the current experi-
mental conditions.  
Data were collected on the performance of these tasks 
from a variety of sources throughout the study for later 
consolidation and analyses. During each run, screen re-
cordings were taken on each of the workstations. Actions 
performed by participants within MACS and the various 
states and aspects of the traffic were recorded in real-time 
by MACS data collection processes. Participants complet-
ed post-run questionnaires after the conclusion of each da-
ta collection run as well as one post-simulation question-
naire administered at the end of the entire study.  
 
4. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Because of the open-ended nature of human-in-the-loop 
simulations whereby actions of the controller participants 
can change the nature of the simulated traffic flows, the 
next section will first cover descriptive analyses of 
throughout and safety both on the whole and per the indi-
vidual sectors (sections 4.1 and 4.2) before moving into 
the analyses of human-automation interaction styles (sec-
tion 4.3).  
4.1 Capacity and Safety 
Aircraft counts were calculated and recorded in real 
time at one-minute intervals for each sector during each 
run. Figure 7 shows the average aircraft counts collapsed 
across all 6 data collection runs. After an initial ramping 
up of traffic in the first quarter of a run, traffic densities 
increased to sustained average levels of approximately 23 
aircraft for the narrowest and most local flow constrained 
sector (38) and approximately 29 aircraft for the larger and 
less local flow constrained sectors (49 and 59). These re-
sults verify that the targeted levels of aircraft counts were 
met and maintained by the test sector controllers across the 
simulated runs. 
 
Figure 7. Average aircraft counts across all 6 runs per sector. 
To assess the basic level of operational safety in the test 
airspace, LOS events were examined. A LOS was record-
ed anytime two aircraft were simultaneously closer than 5 
nautical miles (nmi) laterally and less than 800 feet apart 
vertically. To be included in the following analysis, a LOS 
had to occur within one of the test sectors after the first 
five minutes of a run and last for more than 12 consecutive 
seconds (one full, simulated radar position update). LOS 
events were further categorized into Operational Errors 
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(OE) and Proximity Events (PE) based upon the lateral 
separation at the closet point of approach measured along 
the diagonal between the aircraft. If that lateral separation 
distance was between 4.5 nmi and 5.0 nmi horizontally, 
the LOS was counted as a PE; whereas if that distance was 
less than 4.5 nmi, the LOS was counted as an OE.  
Across the 240 minutes of the six runs multiple LOS 
events were scripted to occur inside the test airspace. Only 
two LOS events actually occurred: both classified as PE. 
However, both LOS events were found to be attributable 
to simulation artifacts. Specifically, the first PE was due to 
a confederate pseudo pilot failing to comply with a con-
troller’s issued clearance to maintain a specified flight lev-
el. The other was due to a traffic scenario design error that 
unrealistically stacked two departure aircraft together and 
did not provide the confederate ghost controller a fair 
amount of time to resolve prior to their entry into the test 
airspace. In sum, these results verify that appropriate lev-
els of separation safety were maintained despite the in-
creased levels of traffic and built in conflicts.  
 
4.2 Individual Sector Differences 
A priori differences in sectors in terms of a sector’s 
demand for climbing and descending aircraft, average time 
and distances for aircraft to cross a sector, and the nature 
of the conflicts common to a sector were analyzed as po-
tential contributing factors to a controller’s interaction 
style with the automation. A characterization of each of 
these differences follows. 
4.2.1 Transitioning Arrival and Departure Air-
craft 
Unique aircraft handled by each controller over the 
course of a run were counted and classified as either a 
transitioning aircraft or an overflight. These were averaged 
per run and the results can be seen in Figure 8. Transition-
ing aircraft included those descending towards or climbing 
out of airports in the local vicinity of the test sectors (e.g., 
DTW, YYZ, BUF, etc.). These flights created additional 
complexity for controllers on account of the associated un-
certainty and additional constraints and demands not at-
tributed to overflights, which could nominally be left at the 
same altitude across a sector.  
 
Figure 8. Number of aircraft handled on average by a sector controller 
in a single run. 
A single factor ANOVA was conducted to examine 
these differences and found a significantly higher propor-
tion of transitioning aircraft for sector 79 over all the other 
sectors F(4,25) = 39.35, p < .001. Sectors 26 and 38 had 
the next highest proportion, which were in turn significant-
ly higher than the proportions of transitioning aircraft for 
sectors 59 and 49.   
4.2.2 Sector Crossing Time and Distance 
One of the most visibly apparent individual differences 
between the controllers is the shape and size of the sector 
they controlled (Fig. 6). These aspects combine to affect 
how much time and what kind of space controllers’ have 
to work with for aircraft in their sector before the aircraft 
is handed off to the next sector. Sector crossing data were 
recorded for each aircraft that transited a sector to capture 
how many seconds an aircraft spent in a sector and how 
far it flew within that sector. 
A separate single-factor ANOVA was run to test for 
differences in both the transit times and transit distances of 
aircraft for each sector. In both cases, statistical signifi-
cance was found indicative of more time and space for 
sector 49 when compared to any other sector; time: F 
(4,1410) = 2.98, p < .05, distance: F (4,1410) = 3.49, p < 
.01 with other comparisons failing to obtain significance 
(Fig. 9).      
 
Figure 9. Average aircraft sector crossing times (secs) and distances 
(nm). 
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4.2.3 Conflicts 
During the simulation, a conflict event was logged at 
each track update where two aircraft were predicted to 
come into LOS at a future point in time in one of the test 
sectors. Figure 10 shows the average number of conflicts 
predicted for each sector across all six runs. A single-
factor ANOVA was used to test for average conflict fre-
quency differences among the five controllers. Average 
occurrences of unique conflict pairs differed significantly 
across the controllers, F (4,25) = 12.43, p < .001 with sec-
tors 59 and 79 having significantly higher average number 
of conflicts per run than sectors 26 and 49 who in turn had 
a significantly higher average number of conflicts per run 
than sector 38  (Fig. 10). 
 
Figure 10. Average number of conflicts per sector per run. 
Lastly, for each conflict pair the vertical state for each 
involved aircraft was recorded at that point in time. Con-
flict pairs were categorized as level conflicts if both air-
craft were level, or transitioning conflicts if either aircraft 
in the pair was in a climb or descent. Figure 11 shows the 
average distributions of level conflicts on top of transition-
ing conflicts for each sector. A single factor ANOVA was 
used to test for differences in the average percentage of 
transitioning conflicts between the sectors. Sector 79 had a 
significantly higher proportion of conflicts that involved 
transitioning aircraft, F(4,25) = 4.55, p < .01. Comparisons 
between the other sectors did not obtain significant differ-
ences.   
 
Figure 11. Proportional number of conflicts that involved level versus 
transitioning aircraft. 
 
 
4.3 Human-Automation Interaction Styles 
For the present analysis of human automation interac-
tion styles, four major sources of information were inves-
tigated. These included route, altitude, and/or speed 
amendments uplinked by the automation without any con-
troller involvement; amendments uplinked by a controller 
with little to no automation involvement; interventions is-
sued by a controller to inhibit the automation’s ability to 
uplink to an aircraft; and subjective workload ratings and 
responses from questionnaires pertaining to participants’ 
trust and use of the automation.    
4.3.1 Uplinks  
A total of 709 uplinks were counted across all five con-
trollers and all six runs. 151 of these uplinks occurred 
without the presence of a conflict for the involved aircraft, 
whereas the remaining 558 uplinks concerned conflicts. 
From Fig. 12, it can be seen that sector 38 had the greatest 
percentage of non-conflict uplinks and sector 49 the least.   
 
Figure 12. Total uplinks categoized by conflict presence and sector 
For uplinks where the automation detected conflicts, 
the status of the automation in resolving that conflict (Fig. 
5) was recorded. Figure 13 shows the average proportions 
of different resolution automation states for each test sec-
tor.  
 
 
Figure 13. Averaged proportions of status of resolution automation 
for uplinks involving conflicts. 
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4.3.2 Full-auto Resolution Uplinks 
288 of the conflict uplinks were full-auto resolutions 
not involving a controller and of these, 12.5% were tacti-
cal avoidance TSAFE resolutions and the remaining 
87.5% were sent strategically with more than three mins 
until LOS.  A single-factor ANOVA was used to test for 
proportional full-auto resolution uplink differences among 
the five controllers. The average percentage of uplinks that 
were full-auto resolutions per run differed significantly 
across the controllers, F (4,25) = 18.63, p < .01 with sec-
tors 49 and 59 having significantly higher average per-
centages of full-auto uplinks than sector 79 who in turn 
had a significantly higher full-auto percentage than sectors 
26 and 38 (Fig. 14). 
 
Figure 14. Average percentage of uplinks in a run that were full-auto, 
i.e. the green bars from Fig. 13. 
4.3.3 Pro-active Controller Resolution Uplinks 
Prior to the automation getting involved in the resolu-
tion of a conflict, a controller could issue a resolution on 
his/her own in response to a conflict alert or even, as men-
tioned above, without a conflict alert at all. In addition to 
the 151 non-conflict uplinks (Fig. 12), a total of 97 uplinks 
were issued by controllers across the runs while the con-
flict automation status box was still black/blank; i.e. indic-
ative that the automation had not yet begun to work on re-
solving that conflict (Fig 13). Taking these two numbers 
together provides a measurement of how pro-
active/preemptive a sector controller was in issuing resolu-
tion clearances. 
A single-factor ANOVA was used to test for differ-
ences in the pro-activeness of sector controllers in resolu-
tion clearance uplinks.  Average percentages of uplinks 
that were executed by controllers preemptive of automa-
tion differed significantly across the controllers, F (4,25) = 
3.95, p < .05 with sector 38 showing significantly higher 
levels of pro-activeness than all the other sectors, and sec-
tor 49 the lowest (Fig. 15).  
 
 
Figure 15. Average percentage of uplinks in a run that were preemp-
tive. 
4.3.4 NU Intervention Frequency and Duration 
An auto-uplink inhibit event “NU” was counted on a 
per plane basis and a total of 100 NU’s were found issued 
by all test controllers across the six different runs. In 87% 
of these cases, controllers inhibited both aircraft involved 
in the conflict as opposed to just one. Figure 16 shows the 
total number of NU’s for each sector as well as the propor-
tionality of NU’s that were issued on top of an active 
TSAFE advisory.  
 
Figure 16. Total NU's issued by a controller in the presence and ab-
sence of TSAFE advisories. 
A single-factor ANOVA was run to test for differences 
in the number of NU’s issued by controllers where the air-
craft involved did not have an active T-SAFE advisory. 
Non-TSAFE NU’s differed significantly across the con-
trollers, F (4,25) = 99.89, p < .001 with sector 38 issuing 
significantly more NU’s outside of TSAFE status on aver-
age per run than any other sector (Fig. 17).    
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Figure 17. Average number of non-TSAFE NU's issued per run 
Controllers could revert an aircraft from NU status back 
to automatic uplink eligibility status at any point or pro-
long their NU status indefinitely while under their owner-
ship. Length of time in NU status was measured as the 
time between an NU and a subsequent AU for the same 
aircraft by the same controller. Initial results indicate that 
elapsed time in NU status ranged from as short as 20 sec-
onds to as long as 379 seconds with an average duration of 
115 seconds across all runs and controllers. Sectors 38 and 
79 had the longest NU duration average at 145 seconds. 
Trends in the results indicate a positive relationship be-
tween number of NU’s issued and length of time aircraft 
were kept in NU status (Fig. 18). In other words, control-
lers with more frequent use of NU left aircraft in NU sta-
tus for longer durations on average versus less frequent 
users of NU who more quickly transitioned aircraft back 
out of NU status.   
 
Figure 18. Average number of seconds controller left aircraft in NU 
status before reverting with AU command. 
4.3.5 Subjectives: Workload 
Throughout each 40-minute run, self-assessment work-
load prompts appeared in the margin at the top of the con-
trollers’ display and lasted for 40 seconds for each prompt. 
Workload ratings were made on a “1” to “6” scale (1 = 
“Very Low Workload” to 6 = “Very High Workload”) 
with averages computed per controller for each run. Nota-
bly, in spite of working about twice the level of present 
day traffic volume, participants still recorded favorable 
workload ratings. Furthermore, while average ratings for 
all participants fell on the lower end of the scale, statistical 
analyses still indicated significant differences between 
their ratings (Fig. 19), F(4,360) = 14.02, p < .001. Sectors 
49 and 59 were the only controllers to never rate their 
workload higher than a “2”. Sector 49 provided a signifi-
cantly lower rating than everyone else except 26, while 
sector 38’s higher workload ratings obtained statistical 
significance as well.  
 
Figure 19. Self-assessed workload ratings: 1 – 2 “Time on hands,” 3 – 
4 “In the groove,” 5 – 6 “Overloaded.” 
4.3.6 Subjectives: Questionnaires  
From their questionnaire responses on the topic of hu-
man-automation interaction styles, controllers showed 
some general consensus both as to what they liked and did 
not like about the automation tools. They also provided 
answers indicative of very different personal opinions on 
particular aspects.   
For each of three different questions asking who should 
be responsible for the detection of conflicts, the generation 
of resolutions and the execution of resolutions, all control-
lers selected the answer “controller and ground automation 
should share.” While the current analysis focuses only 
around the furthest “maximum” NextGen timeframe from 
the larger multi-timeframe experiment, the nature of the 
sequential design of the larger study lends itself to poten-
tial insights on controllers’ developing attitudes over time 
and growing experience with the automation. While fur-
ther analyses are planned to provide more detailed investi-
gations, some relevant insight can still be seen at present 
that shed light on their “maximum” NextGen responses. 
Growth in controller confidence and trust of the automa-
tion can be seen from their increasing experience with it 
over time. Controllers’ confidence grew in the trial plan-
ning tools as they used them. They were only “somewhat 
confident” when they used the tools in the minimum con-
ditions (m = 4) but this confidence increased in the maxi-
mum conditions when they said they were “very confi-
dent” (m = 6). Their confidence grew in a similar way 
when using the strategic conflict advisories: controllers 
were “quite confident” when they used the strategic advi-
sories in the moderate conditions (m = 5.6) and this confi-
dence increased to “confident” in the maximum conditions 
(m = 6). In the moderate condition, controllers’ overall av-
eraged opinion of the accuracy of the TSAFE advisories 
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was that it was accurate (m = 4) and this increased slightly 
as they rated them as quite accurate (m = 4.66) in the max-
imum conditions.     
In spite of the overall positive rating averages of the 
TSAFE tool, controllers did share some common reserva-
tions about its present implementation that limited its reso-
lutions to using vectors without the possibility of using al-
titude resolutions. Example comments from controllers on 
sectors 38, 79, and 49 spoke directly to this: “I did not al-
low the computer to get to the point of needing a TSAFE 
resolution. The result of the computer applying a TSAFE 
was not acceptable to me.” – 38; “The better resolution 
was to stop the climb of one aircraft versus a turn” – 79; 
“With climbing aircraft we had to be more aware to inter-
vene before the computer vectored aircraft, when stopping 
at a lower altitude was a much easier, more efficient reso-
lution” – 49.    
Despite where controller responses agreed with each 
other, other questionnaire answers alluded to striking dif-
ferences in their overall experiences and dispositions. On 
one side of the spectrum, the sector 49 controller had a 
very easy time working with and trusting the automation. 
In a series of post simulation questions referencing a list of 
automation tools that asked what, if any, value was pro-
vided by that tool, this controller exclusively responded ei-
ther “reduced my workload” or “increased my awareness.” 
All other controllers selected answers that stated value was 
added to the operations (i.e., safer, more efficient) rather 
than to themselves or that a tool “had no added value.” 
Additionally, for a question asked at the end of each run: 
“Did you feel rushed and that you did not have enough 
time to complete tasks? Or, did you feel that you did not 
have enough to do?” sector 49 marked the minimum value 
of “1 – very low time pressure” on the 7 point scale every 
time.  
On the other hand, sector 38 indicated a personal pref-
erence and comfort for human control rather than trust of 
automation control in some areas. For example, “I don’t 
always trust the solutions the computer comes up with, and 
never like the TSAFE resolutions” and “I think things will 
get easier as my comfort level increases. I do not always 
trust the solution or believe that they are in the best inter-
est of the aircraft.” Sector 38 answered “had no added val-
ue” to each of the three different value questions regarding 
TSAFE automation.  At the end of a run, 38 was the only 
controller to answer “moderate compensation required to 
maintain adequate performance” to the question “how 
much did you have to compensate for the automation to 
make the tools and concept work?” all others selected ei-
ther “minimal compensation” or “no controller correc-
tion.” Another example of sector 38’s confidence in him-
self over the automation comes from a question that asked 
at the end of a run for the controller to comment on wheth-
er or not they had enough time to resolve their most com-
plex conflict, to which 38 responded “yes, only because I 
saw the potential loss of separation before the computer, 
put an NU on the involved aircraft, and separated them my 
way when the red fifth line appeared.”  
The questionnaire responses from sectors 26, 59 and 79 
generally fell in between 49 and 38 with more moderate 
ratings and/or comments. 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
Working within the human-automation interaction par-
adigm examined in the present analysis, controllers were 
able to maintain safe separation standards in spite of future 
levels of increased air traffic demand. From an absolute 
perspective of taking the group of participants on the 
whole, all the controllers worked well with and liked the 
automated tools. This can be seen from meeting the above 
goals along with low workload ratings and questionnaire 
responses that revealed they preferred sharing separation 
assurance responsibilities with a set of automated tools 
that they increasingly trusted as time and experience with 
them went on. 
Exploring a relative comparison perspective between 
the controllers, the human automation interaction style 
measurements above observably divided the controllers 
along a spectrum with sector 38 placed towards a more 
manual end, sector 49 towards a more automated end, and 
the others falling somewhere in between. With the greatest 
proportion of non-conflict and pro-active trajectory up-
links, as well as the lowest proportion of full-auto uplinks, 
the highest number of NU’s and non-TSAFE NU’s, and 
the greatest average NU status durations, sector 38’s ob-
jective data combine to stand out as a characterization of a 
more active approach to the human-automation team 
working dynamic. This higher level of engagement and ac-
tivity is also reflected in the higher average workload rat-
ings of sector 38 compared to the other sector controllers, 
though notably still well within the acceptable range of the 
workload scale. Sector 49 on the other hand, assumed a 
much more passive approach in the controller-automation 
dynamic, with the highest percentage of full-auto uplinks, 
lowest percentage of uplinks without automation involve-
ment, and relatively low number and duration of automatic 
uplink interventions. Assuming such an approach, sector 
49’s peak workload ratings never exceeded a “2.” The sub-
jective questionnaire responses from 38 and 49 substanti-
ate their differing styles of action, as their own words and 
ratings exhibit contrasting opinions of automation trust 
and use.     
While individual differences in how much people trust 
and use automation will surely always exist based from 
their own personal experiences and attitudes, task charac-
teristics like demand, pressure and complexity might rea-
sonably be expected to influence a person’s behaviors with 
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automated tools.  Individual sector differences from the 
pre-scripted traffic flows and sector geographic dimen-
sions presented the controllers with very different and 
highly contextualized local work environments. Some of 
these factors exist on a level completely independent of a 
controller. For example, sectors 49 and 59 clearly had the 
most time and space to work with aircraft, as well as hav-
ing to serve the lowest demand of transitioning aircraft. 
Other factors also reflect a local work environment that 
dynamically changes based on the actions taken from 
within that environment, as this is the nature of “human-
in-the-loop.” For example, based on the pro-active resolu-
tion approach of the sector 38 controller, the lower number 
of conflicts certainly also reflect his solving of some con-
flicts early enough that they weren’t recorded as conflicts. 
In contrast, sectors 59 (most likely by choice/comfort) and 
79 (most likely by transitioning demand) had much higher 
levels of recorded conflict events.  
Interestingly, sector 59 called out several instances in 
his questionnaire responses where he disapproved of the 
automation’s handling of a situation. He also had approx-
imately the same levels of sector crossing time/distances, 
and transitioning aircraft conflict demand as sector 38. 
However, unlike 38, we observed in his questionnaire 
comments a more passive approach like that of 49, i.e., 
“the hardest part will be to keep the controllers engaged” – 
59. Additionally, the arrangement of the simulation which 
had 59 co-located in the south area alone with 49 and sep-
arate from the other controllers, provided more opportuni-
ty for 59 to observe and be influenced by a functional pas-
sive approach than perhaps would have been afforded to 
him alone.  
From the present analysis, the most clear and single 
mapping between individual sector characteristics and re-
sultant human interaction style appears to be between low-
er levels of transitioning aircraft demand and lower levels 
of pro-active controller resolutions. Less transitioning air-
craft have been observed to lead to fewer short-term con-
flicts and TSAFE advisories. The resultant trend in inter-
action with automation is underscored by the controller’s 
expressed dislike that TSAFE resolutions were limited to 
the lateral dimension alone, which encouraged them to be 
more pro-active in assigning altitude stops themselves.  
Several areas of future research are encouraged from 
the current analysis. While one can get some preliminary 
ideas of controller differences at present, more can be 
learned from subsequent tests in more precisely targeted 
and controlled studies. Most relevant to continuing from 
this exploratory vein of characterizing individually differ-
ent controller-automation interaction styles would be a be-
tween-subjects designed study with either controller par-
ticipants randomly rotated between or experimentally 
paired in specific sectors to ascertain relative effects of lo-
calized traffic and sector demands on a priori attitude to-
wards trust/use of the automation.  Additionally, further 
analysis of metrics to independently characterize traffic 
conflicts in open-loop runs would help to more accurately 
identify the variance in task or problem posed to each sec-
tor and speak towards levels of controller reliance on au-
tomation.  Lastly, while flexible and accommodating to 
multiple styles of real-time usage, all the controllers in the 
present analysis shared the same underlying automation 
configuration parameters.  In the future, this might not 
need to be the case. Individually tailored automation set-
tings per the various localized sector environments and 
controller preferences for automation task sharing styles 
might be set ahead of time or flexibly adapted in real-time 
based on performance.   
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The automation’s design was very flexible, with multi-
ple interaction points for different stages of manual and 
automated control and so accommodated a variety of indi-
vidually different passive to active work styles of the con-
troller participants. The provision of increased ranges of 
opportunities for the automation to act independently and 
be previewed in doing so were well received by some sec-
tors (49 and 59) while others felt much more comfortable 
with exercising the auto uplink intervention NU function-
alities (38 and 79).  Not only did the controllers work with 
the automation to meet their safety and traffic level goals 
in this simulated future NextGen timeframe, they also did 
so in different ways and with different attitudes of 
trust/use of the automation. The prototyped controller-
automation functional allocation framework was on the 
whole very flexible and very successful. 
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